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Sense of community responsibility at the forefront of
crisis management
Neil M. Boyd and Eric C. Martin
Management & Organizations Department, Freeman College of Management, Bucknell University,
Lewisburg, PA, USA
ABSTRACT
The COVID-19 pandemic has made it clear that a sense of commu-
nity responsibility is crucial to mitigate the effects of viral spread.
Many citizens across the world have heeded the call to isolate and
self-distance, yet large numbers of individuals do not seem to under-
stand their responsibility for others. This article explores how a sense
of community responsibility is born in community contexts, how
various features of a crisis impact community responsibility, and how
public administration plays a crucial role in facilitating mitigation
and solutions to crisis. The article also explores the utility of the
Community Experience Model in crisis management contexts, and sets
the stage for further exploration of community experiences in disas-







As most of us are attempting to self-distance and do our part during the COVID-19
pandemic, there is bewilderment as to why some folks feel they have a right to do what-
ever they want. Whether that means partying on the beach in mass numbers, keeping
the faithful worshiping in large group services, defying the pleas and directives of a gov-
ernor to close your doors, or protesting in front of government buildings to immedi-
ately open the economy, there are those who apparently feel they do not have a sense
of responsibility to others. Some might argue that those individuals just do not care
about others. We do not agree with that line of reasoning as a common argument, and
instead propose that a sense of community responsibility is shaped by the context of a
community during a crisis situation.
As Nowell and Boyd (2010) propose in the Community Experience Model a sense of
community responsibility (SOC-R) emerges as individuals develop personal values,
norms, ideals, and beliefs about responsibility when they are embedded in various insti-
tutions (e.g., families, churches, schools, neighborhoods, social groups). As individuals
enter into community contexts, the setting will evoke sentiments of duty and obligation
for some people as they seek to reconcile who they perceive they are in a given context
and their normative beliefs about what a person like them should do in such a setting.
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In short, individuals will experience a greater sense of community responsibility when
cognitive dissonance is reduced between signals in the community about responsibility
and individual perceptions of how responsible one should be. Once invoked, SOC-R
perceptions are theorized to stimulate community engagement behaviors that are not
based solely out of an expectation for direct personal gain (see Nowell & Boyd, 2010,
2014). Moreover, a sense of community (SOC) develops when membership, shared
emotional connection, influence, and other basic needs are fulfilled by the community
context (McMillan & Chavis, 1986; Nowell & Boyd, 2010). Recent studies show that
SOC especially correlates with psychological well-being measures, which in turn help
stimulate further outcomes in institutional settings (Boyd, Nowell, Yang, & Hano, 2018;
Boyd & Nowell, 2017, 2020; Nowell & Boyd, 2014). Further, given that SOC and SOC-R
are related yet unique constructs (Boyd & Nowell, 2014; Nowell & Boyd, 2010, 2014)
the presence of a sense of community can assist in the formation of a sense of commu-
nity responsibility. When an individual has a predetermined sense of community with a
specific collective of others, and conditions arise that enable the formation of a sense of
community responsibility, it makes sense that previous collectives of connection would
likely see greater perceptual and behavioral assistance compared to collectives where
one has no significant ties.
Sense of community responsibility in crisis
The case of the current COVID-19 situation exposes us to new thinking about a sense
of community responsibility in crisis. On any given day, individuals exhibit general
dispositions toward prosocial motivation (Grant, 2008) and altruism (Batson, 2011),
and a sense of community responsibility for specific collectives. During a crisis, we
contend that concern for others starts at the epicenter of personal existence, and it
fans out from there. We also contend that it begins in collectives where one had pre-
viously developed a sense of community. Therefore, in the current crisis, we believe
citizens are acting for self-prevention to avoid illness. They are also likely protecting
others (a spouse, children, a partner, a friend), and in those cases the community col-
lective is clear. It is right in front of them. Citizens may have also acted to help pro-
tect those in their neighborhood, town, region, state, nation and the world. On the
one hand, it appears that some citizens are receiving plenty of signals that this is the
right thing to do, whether they are heeding the advice of Dr. Fauci, the governor of
their state, their mother, or other individuals who are shedding light on what one
should do in this current context. However, for those who have not heeded the call to
act responsibly now, we believe they lack clear and consistent signals of what they
should do in relation to specific community referents from the appropriate level of
governance, and across levels of governance, associated with the scope and scale of
the COVID-19 crisis.
The Community Experience Model has utility in helping us understand contextual fea-
tures in crisis management situations, and why actors either engage, or resist engage-
ment, in community responsibility. A key point in our presentation is that when the
community referent of responsibility becomes muddled, it causes a domino effect on
the clarity of what to do, when to do it, and how to do it for individual actors as they
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perceive how they should act, in relation to what the community context signals as nor-
mative values of how one should act. We use the model to highlight four important and
interrelated attributes of the COVID-19 crisis commonly articulated in the crisis man-
agement literature that altered response efforts and influenced community experience.
First, variations in personal characteristics play a role in how individuals interpret the
impending threat of a crisis. Second, several attributes of a crisis context impact percep-
tions of responsibility. The speed of the crisis and the relatively slow spread of this crisis
differentiates it from what one might expect from a single event (e.g., terrorist attack,
earthquake). A lack of clarity around problem definition created political divisions and
differential responses across the country, and varying degrees of risk tolerance and
exposure to the crisis resulted in a patchwork of responses. Third, several attributes of
moral leaders during the crisis have impeded a sense of responsibility. The central ele-
ments we consider are trust, tone, and messaging. Finally, transfer of learning varied for
those who had not yet been affected by the crisis, even as they watched others dealing
with it. We propose that all of these sources increase the probability of cognitive disson-
ance for citizens, and as articulated in the Community Experience Model, greater levels
of cognitive dissonance in a community context around how one should act in a par-
ticular crisis situation creates havoc in efficient and effective behavioral responses of
responsibility toward others (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Community experience model in crisis management.
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Factors of crisis and community responsibility
Personal characteristics
At the far left of the model, notice that individuals enter community contexts with val-
ues and beliefs about responsibility toward others. One might conceptualize this state as
prosocial motivation, “the desire to expend effort to benefit other people” (Grant, 2008,
p. 48), or as a perception that one should be altruistic, “a motivational state with the
ultimate goal of increasing another’s welfare,” Batson (2011, p. 20). However, disasters
do not strike stakeholders uniformly, and crises are perceived differently, at different
times, by different individuals. As of this writing, some leaders in California are closing
beaches, while others in the same state are opening them. We see variations like this
across the nation as well. According to Wallace (1956) disasters consists of various
impact zones where actors (victims or responders) define the disaster’s proximity, per-
haps differently. The global pandemic has shown us that crisis impacts vary across geo-
graphical space, that communities are heterogeneous, and perceived vulnerability varies
widely within them (Lindell, 2013).
More often than not, people will differ in their perception and appreciation of a
threat. In fact, we might say that crises are continuously subjected to the forces of inter-
pretation and politicization (Edelman, 1977). This takes place at multiple levels with dis-
tinctions between how individuals, groups, organizations and communities respond
(Rudolph & Repenning, 2002) creating a “cascade of disruption among interdependent
operating systems that shatters the existing functional capacity” (Comfort, Ko, &
Zagorecki, 2004, p. 295). Consider the current state of testing in the United States. The
Federal government suggests testing is a state responsibility, while states seek Federal
guidance and support, and firms seek to purchase testing kits on their own. Volume
and competition have overwhelmed the supply chain.
Attributes of a crisis context: Speed, problem identification and risk
Disasters, and responses to them, unfold over time. Crises may emerge suddenly or
they may develop slowly from an over accumulation of interruptions which weaken an
organizational system’s ability to respond effectively, reducing resiliency (Perrow, 1984;
Rudolph & Repenning, 2002). Regardless of how they unfold, environmental jolts
expose fundamental underlying organizational weaknesses (Meyer, 1982), requiring
organizational learning to adapt (Terreberry, 1968) and interpretation to enhance
strategic response (Barr, 1998).
Critical events that directly affect an organization change their subjective understand-
ing of time in a crisis (Fleischer, 2013). Hospitals and public administrators in New
York City are reacting to this crisis with urgency. Consider the multi-level integrated
approaches required to repurpose the Javits Center, relocate the Navy hospital ship
U.S.N.S. Comfort and build field hospitals in Central Park. Urgency gets crises on the
agenda and allows many stakeholders to see the problem simultaneously and recognize
their mutual dependencies. While that creates complexity and does not guarantee
desired outcomes, it does build moral community quickly.
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In the COVID-19 pandemic, movement has been more akin to the climate change prob-
lem, the ultimate slow crisis compared to say, an earthquake, flood or terrorist attack. In a
preexisting and well-established moral community, one might expect a slow crisis actually to
be beneficial to outcomes, allowing time for stakeholders to share, learn and borrow best
practices from early movers. But this crisis instead created pockets of state and local moral
community and not a unified national moral community. As a result, since the United
States first learned of this impending COVID-19 disaster, we have seen a gradual and often
reluctant rollout of temporary measures, half-steps and incremental changes that became
increasingly more stringent as political winds changed. Agreement on the meaning of isola-
tion, quarantine, self-isolation, self-quarantine, and social distancing is slow and varied. This
incremental approach is fine, and even favored at times, for normal policy implementation,
but not for emergency policy, as the world now knows. In pockets of high rates of infection,
we saw much faster responses, moral communities, and strict control. But in other areas,
political forces and indeed protests, have limited stringent controls to prevent virus spread.
While New York struggled, Georgia reopened hair salons and bowling alleys.
This is not only an issue of proximity. Questioning whether COVID-19 is a health or
economic crisis, or an urban or rural issue created a “wicked problem”—where we dis-
agree on both the problem and the solution. These are the worst kinds of problems
because parochial decision-makers can too easily shift the agenda by changing the
nature of the crisis. It leaves decision-making up to all sorts of individuals at various
levels, which is suboptimal for crisis communication. When we are questioning whether
it is in fact a crisis, it makes it more difficult to take extraordinary measures. Wicked
problems make it difficult for individuals to agree on the nature of the disaster and
potential mitigation and solutions to the crisis. Action can be difficult in the midst of
stakeholders still questioning whether the situation is actually a threat. Over time, that
dissipates. In the case of COVID-19, there was a period where there was no urgency to
act, and even when urgency became apparent, disagreement over the severity and nature
of the problems, and over mitigation and solutions, contributed to a lack of clarity for
many individuals as to for whom, where, when, and how they should act. In
Pennsylvania, our local administrators likened Covid-19 to the flu, posted figures about
common causes of death suggesting this was a minor threat, and reminded local busi-
nesses that the Governor’s restrictions were only voluntary.
The COVID-19 crisis has also highlighted that multiple disasters add to the complex-
ity of the community context of responsibility. Not only were we dealing with a health-
care crisis, but we were experiencing an economic crisis at the same time. And these
two crises were at odds with each other because greater amounts of social-distancing
required greater sacrifices of personal-economic and macro-economic stability.
Governor Pritzker of Illinois, for example, faced enormous political backlash when he
closed bars and restaurants just prior to St. Patrick’s Day, an enormous event in
Chicago. In retrospect, as a health protection move, this was not premature at all, des-
pite relatively low numbers of infection at the time. The presence of multiple disasters
clearly increases cognitive dissonance in relation to one’s perception of how they should
act in a given community context, relative to signals that they are receiving from the
context. We also fear that additional crises could occur, such as the potential for certain
actors to take advantage of us in our weakened state.
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Regardless of the burn rate of a crisis, and whether this is primarily an economic or
health issue, an important factor that influences community responsibility is the amount
of risk present. Risk has two components, the odds of it occurring and the damage it
causes should it occur. In slow burn contexts, both of these risks take longer to manifest
and become clear, but even in immediate crises, there is a period of time where individ-
uals are not able to fully comprehend the type of risks and direct impacts to oneself.
This is also true for assessing risks for the collectives near them and exacerbates as one
considers distal communities that they are not necessarily connected to by identity or
by perceptual connection. A lack of risk clarity likely decreases understanding of who
one should be responsible for, and when, how and where one should act.
As the probability and impact of risk are in flux at the beginning of a crisis event, we
have observed that first movers who acted with an abundance of caution were subjected
to embarrassment, shame, disdain, or disbelief. Protests actually unfolded against social
distancing and restrictive state measures. This is true for the parent who was attempting
to speak truth to their family, the CEO who was trying to help employees understand
the level and severity of risk, and for political leaders who were tempted to spin a nar-
rative in a way that helps them in the moment and at the next election cycle. Because
of inherent risks during a crisis, there is a greater probability of multiple signals in the
community context, which again reduces an understanding of whom one should be
responsible for and how to direct responsible behavioral actions.
Attributes of moral leaders during a crisis: Trust, tone, & messaging
We find several actions (and inactions) with respect to this crisis worth noting as areas
for improvement to mitigate the effect of the slow pace, problem identification and risk
tolerance. Leaders could better communicate priority of social order in decision making
by favoring experts over partisan responses. Leaders can also act swiftly and decisively
by making the case for proximal distance. While lessons learned from China may have
seemed too distant to create a “global moral community,” one might expect lessons
from New York City to be more readily accepted. This appeared true in states close to
New York, either physically, or close in terms of size and culture, like the other major
cities of Boston, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.
Clear, direct and aligned communication from moral or cultural leaders can reduce
political challenges, misinformation and uncertainty. Studies of disasters in a variety of
contexts over several decades in Bosnia (Martin, 2004), Haiti (Martin, Nolte, & Vitolo,
2016), Ukraine (Krasynska & Martin, 2017), and the European Refugee Crisis (Martin
& Nolte, 2020), suggest that stakeholders observed the presence of multiple voices
repeating different messages and the lack of a single national or international voice.
Stakeholders reported partisan political divides and limited effective response.
Misinformation, whether deliberate or through gossip, significantly contributed to
inaction. Uncertainty about the future, and the actions of others, often limited holistic
and timely decision-making toward protective or protectionist behaviors.
The development of a moral community that transcends normal boundaries of what
constituents view as “similar” requires trust in leadership. Polling numbers of trust in
the president and administrators matter. Crisis is not the time to push partisan agendas.
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Misleading side comments and lack of messaging discipline, whether intentional or not,
creates problems in clear messaging that is vital at times of national emergency.
Administrators have had to roll back comments from the U.S. President about alterna-
tive, ineffective and even bizarre treatments for this virus. How they do this pits polit-
ical trust against administrative expertise. A history of trust matters as well, and feeds
into the believability of the current messaging. A lack of trust in the person and the
message will detract from the capability of the signals in the community context to align
with values for community responsibility. While some disregarded untruthful messaging
and acted to social-distance, many citizens acted according to the distorted messages
because they were under the impression that they were correct.
Many decision makers missed the opportunity to convey messages about why they were
shutting down or closing, causing misinformation to emerge. A common refrain in public
discourse was, we are not shutting down because we are afraid for our own health and safety,
but we are doing it for the sake of our community. These were public acts of civic responsibil-
ity to our stakeholders—overwhelmed hospitals, workers’ families, and many others. Many
citizens believed that self-distancing was an overreaction based on the concerns of a few
stakeholders. However, higher-level authorities have many additional stakeholders and per-
spectives to consider. But for those who do not trust or respect leadership, this only adds
fuel to their skepticism about the clarity of signals toward responsibility.
Without leadership at the appropriate level of analysis taking responsibility and making
tough decisions, other individuals will begin to act based on their personal and profes-
sional sense of community and sense of community responsibility. As we noted earlier,
Illinois governor Pritzker made the call to close restaurants and bars for St. Patrick’s Day.
He was out front and took a lot of heat for that. In retrospect, even that move was late.
However, the state of Illinois is not at the appropriate level to match the scope and sever-
ity of the COVID-19 crisis. By January of 2020, it was clear to many that this crisis had
the potential for worldwide impacts, and as such requires a worldwide response.
Organizations like the World Health Organization (WHO) would seem to be an
appropriate entity to respond, but they do not hold power over citizens of nations.
Therefore, the most important level of public administration in the current crisis
quickly became federal governments. But for too long we had a president, and other
actors, who were wavering. For the most part, the Center for Disease Control and
Prevention (CDC) was not wavering. Dr. Fauci became a figurehead because he repre-
sented a national-level role player of substance, and he has been saying the same thing
for a long time now. To have political narratives, or competing economic narratives,
gain prominence when experts at the appropriate level of administration are advocating
for community responsibility was a big problem in the current crisis. Instead, we
needed synergy between political leaders and expertise engrained in the offices of public
administration within relevant agencies to the specific nature of the crisis.
Learning: As process & outcome
Learning, knowledge creation, information and reliable decision making prove powerful
and important forces as a process in the community context, and as a higher-order out-
come that ultimately helps improve disaster response (Celik & Corbacioglu, 2010;
ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY & PRAXIS 7
Kruke & Olsen, 2012; Moynihan, 2008). Strong ties between organizations can help
mitigate uncertainty and promote adaptation (Kraatz, 1998). Stephenson (2005) con-
curred by suggesting the importance of sense-making and trust to improve coordinated
multi-organizational humanitarian responses as perhaps one way to overcome what
might actually be different institutional logics to understanding not only the crisis, and
its response, but perceptions of organizational roles and those of other stakeholders
(Hesse, Kreutzer, & Diehl, 2019). In addition, Browning, Beyer, and Shetler (1995) argue
that cooperative interorganizational cooperation requires the development of a moral
community where individuals act without the immediate need for reciprocity. They
found cultural leaders develop rationales that are communicated clearly to reduce
uncertainty and help nurture a shared set of values. People “need to have faith that their
efforts will be rewarded at a later, undefined time, and that these choices to offer and
risk are matters of individual honor and pride” (p. 144).
As the virus began to spread beyond the borders of China, countries across the world
began a search for mitigation best practices. Various countries approached containment
differently. The UK isolated the vulnerable and allowed the rest of the population to
carry on as usual, the so-called “herd immunity” strategy. South Korea responded
quickly with strict quarantines and widespread testing. China cracked down with mas-
sive quarantines and draconian enforcement tactics. Many in the United States watched
with disdain, and droves of individuals dismissed action as communist and authoritar-
ian. Then we watched democratic and liberal Italy allow self-policing to no avail. They
eventually verged on martial law as their laissez faire containment strategy did not
work. We dismissed this and other lessons. We did not believe another country’s
actions would be tolerated in America, and many U.S. citizens and public figures over-
estimated our capacity and strength. We then repeated this pattern within the United
States, as some state responses seemed to ignore the experiences of other states. This
cognitive distortion of invulnerability contributed to messaging in the public domain,
which signaled that action was not required at this time, and its presence created cogni-
tive dissonance that helped to slow down community responsibility for many actors.
In addition to specific state responses, we might also consider the following cultural
differences (see Hofstede Insights, 2020) in national and regional mitigation. Chinese
and South Korean culture supports a significant power distance, and citizens tend to
follow authority. Italy and South Korea exhibit very high uncertainty avoidance cultures.
They do not like risk. And each of these countries have a longer-term orientation than
the United States which exhibits low power distance, high individualism, and low uncer-
tainty avoidance. This profile translates into a high-risk tolerance, which further con-
tributes to cognitive distortions of invulnerability. Cultural difference seems to be
playing out in variations between rural and urban response, as well as some differences
based on political affiliation. The dense population and Democratic control of New
York City, for example, seems so culturally different to decision makers in Republican
controlled rural areas that lessons seem irrelevant.
The value of public administration for community responsibility
The COVID-19 crisis reminds us all of the value of public administration. Garrett
(2020) recently published the first article about COVID-19 in Administrative Theory &
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Praxis of what we imagine will be many more in the coming years. Our dialog suggests
that one of the most crucial charges of public administrators rests on the ability to cre-
ate reliable signals of community responsibility in the public domain. When conflicts
over values abound, administrative independence is not sufficiently effective in protect-
ing individuals with disparate views, and we must instead turn to our own traditions
and values (Spicer, 2001). As the Community Experience Model posits, signals regarding
these traditions and values are necessary to reduce cognitive dissonance of responsibil-
ity, which in turn will increase the probability of collective action of responsibility for
a community.
The politics-administration dichotomy has been debated in these pages before (e.g.,
see Overeem, 2005; Svara, 2006), and we recognize the blurred distinction between the
two. Yet, we strongly believe that administration must be anchored in analysis, rigor,
and science. Politics, by contrast, is the art of influencing. A critical factor in the com-
munity context is the value and need for responsive and effective public administration.
Disasters especially require administrators to reduce uncertainty, anticipate problems,
project need, and describe, explain, and predict events (Herzog, 2007). Perhaps we have
been taking this for granted. Good administration during an emergency transcends pol-
itics. As Demir (2009) suggested, the greater the ambiguity, “The more often adminis-
trators can engage in political activity with little chance that it will be visible to the
other party or to the public in general. This poses great risk for democratic
accountability” (p. 523).
The federal government has not responded particularly well because several important
top officials have leaned too much toward the “politics” dimension of public administra-
tion instead of the “administration” dimension. This has contributed to confusion about
community responsibility, and compelled other actors (especially Governors and local
officials) to cast narratives and statements of authority that were in contrast to the
Federal government. In the moment where crises and chaos meet, citizens look to lead-
ership for clarity. In fact, they crave it. Yes, it exposes public leaders and decisions mak-
ers to extraordinary political risk. But even worse, a lack of appropriate response
exposes us all to greater risks for the common good. The mantra of utilitarian good
governance remains, “the greatest good for the greatest number of people” (Bentham,
1776, preface 2nd para.).
The crisis also highlighted the importance of public administrators and politicians to
quickly grasp the appropriate level of response to the nature and scope of the crisis.
The COVID-19 crisis is worldwide, and therefore leaders of nations need to play critical
roles to design and orchestrate consistent and clear messaging that the community ref-
erent is the world and our nation. Efficiency in crises actually increases with the num-
ber of jurisdictions involved, suggesting the need for higher levels of administration and
coordination with the critical variables of information dissemination and clear commu-
nication as a paramount to improve response and reduce uncertainty and limit subject-
ive interpretations (Comfort et al., 2004). The most important response for gaining
widespread community responsibility is consistent clear communication of responsibil-
ity. The mixed messages between federal, state and local governments, public and pri-
vate sector organizations, and between individuals across the nation, caused concern,
questioning, disbelief, and a slower than needed response. Citizens have heard
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inconsistent messaging over these past weeks and months, and that fact is the most
important factor that can contribute to cognitive dissonance for individuals who may
want to act, but are compelled to avoid acting until the signals in the community con-
text are obvious for immediate action.
As a crisis event is unfolding, public administrators have a responsibility to under-
stand the complexity of the situation, and convert that understanding into accurate and
consistent messaging. If the United States government had appropriately recognized
that they were the most important actor toward signaling responsibility in the context
of the community, it is likely that citizens across the nation would have acted sooner.
As we noted earlier, responsibility toward others begins at the epicenter of our exist-
ence. We tend to be responsible for ourselves first, then to proximal others in our lives,
and less responsible to people who are distal to us. Citizens need public administrators
who can establish the boundary of the crisis, and signal that this is a world, national,
state, county, town, or neighborhood event. We need public administrators who can
isolate the nature and priority of the crisis, and in the present case help citizens under-
stand that this is first and foremost a global healthcare crisis. Secondarily there are eco-
nomic ramifications, but without a focus on the healthcare problem, a prospering
economy is not possible. While it is understandable for politicians and business owners
to redefine the crisis around personal and political concerns, doing so muddles critical
messaging to our communities. Let us recall the words of Woodrow Wilson (1887) in
his classic, The Study of Administration,
Large powers and unhampered discretion seem to me the indispensable conditions of
responsibility … There is no danger in power, if only it be not irresponsible. If it be
divided, dealt out in shares to many, it is obscured; and if it be obscured, it is made
irresponsible. (p. 213)
Conclusion
Our dialog here highlights potential for further integration of the Community
Experiences Model in disaster and crisis management scholarship and practice. This
case exposed the importance of the politics-administration dichotomy. It reaffirmed
the importance of Federalism and the alignment of National, State and Local responsi-
bilities and authority. It highlights the importance of bureaucracies and expert-based
governmental entities such as the Center for Disease Control and the Federal Reserve,
and the need for funding, supporting, and trusting these entities in times of emer-
gency. And finally, it highlights the role of leaders and public administrators in defin-
ing crisis proximity to build a community context that supports a sense of community
responsibility.
No matter the type, scope, or severity of a crisis, in every case, we need individuals
who will step up and engage in community responsibility behaviors. As we have
attempted to demonstrate here, those behaviors rely on alignment between cognitive
perceptions of a sense of community responsibility, identification with and perceptions
of a sense of community for specific collectives, and signals in the community context
that help guide when, where, and how citizens should direct their responsible behavior.
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